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Abstract 
This paper discusses the implications of climate change for official transfers from rich countries 
(the North) to poor countries (the South) when the motivation for transfers is ethical rather than 
strategic. Traditional development transfers to increase income and reduce poverty are 
complemented by new financial flows to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation transfers) 
and become climate-resilient (adaptation transfers). We find that in the absence of barriers to 
adaptation, mitigation or development, climate change will make isolated transfers less efficient: 
A large part of their intended effect (to increase income, reduce emissions, or boost climate-
resilience) dissipates as the South reallocates its own resources to achieve the mitigation, 
adaptation and consumption balance it prefers. Only in the case of least-developed countries, 
which are unable to adapt fully due to income constraints, will adaptation support lead to more 
climate resilience. In all other cases, if the North wishes to change the balance between 
mitigation, adaptation and consumption it should structure its transfers as “matching grants”, 
which are tied to the South’s own level of funding. Alternatively, the North could provide an 
integrated “climate-compatible development” package that recognizes the combined climate and 
development requirements of the South. If the aim is to increase both mitigation and adaptation 
in the South, development assistance that increases the income level, can an effective measure, 
but only if there is an international agreement and the recipient country is not income 
constrained. If the recipient country is very poor, development aid may reduce adaptation effort.  
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1. Introduction 
The twin needs of poverty alleviation and environmental protection have long been recognized 
as complementary challenges. There is by now an extensive body of work that documents the 
close links between environment and development, a literature to which Anil Markandya has 
made wide-ranging contributions (e.g. Pearce et al. 1990; Markandya and Pearce 1991; 
Markandya 1998, 2002, 2008; Markandya and Nurty 2004).  
 
Perhaps less appreciated in the academic literature is the fact that environment-development 
links also extend to questions of finance. Official development assistance has been subject to 
extensive research in particular about aid effectiveness (e.g., Dollar and Easterly 1999; Collier 
and Dollar 2002, 2004; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007), but environmental finance has 
become a topic of wider academic interest only recently in the context of climate change. Under 
the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 (UNFCCC, 2010), and reaffirmed in subsequent negotiation 
documents, developed countries have promised to provide additional climate finance of up to 
$100 billion a year to help developing countries reduce their emissions and adapt to climate 
change. Climate finance is to be explicitly provided on top of conventional development 
assistance, which developed countries have pledged to increase to 0.7% of GDP as part of the 
Millennium Development Goals.  
 
Fankhauser and Pearce (2014) offer a conceptual discussion of sustainable development finance, 
while Haites (2013) provides an overview of climate finance issues. Tol (2005) argued early on 
that development aid can reduce vulnerability to climate change. However, there has been no 
systematic analysis up to now of how environmental finance and development aid interact, either 
from a donor perspective (e.g., in terms of overlapping or competing donor objectives) or from a 
recipients’ point of view (e.g., in terms of the incentives that multiple funding streams provide). 
The aim of this paper is to close this gap, using climate change as a pertinent example.  
 
The paper offers a theoretical model to analyze the ethical motivation of donors in providing 
three kinds of funding to developing countries: funding to alleviate poverty (development aid), 
funding to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation finance) and funding to prepare for 
unavoidable climate change (adaptation finance). The model also studies how the three funding 
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streams affect the ability and inclination of recipient countries to increase consumption, reduce 
emissions and strengthen resilience to climate change.  
 
We specify a two period model (present and future), with a rich region (North) and a poor region 
(South). They play a leader-follower game, where the North calculates the behavior of the South 
before deciding on the optimal level of transfers. We are not concerned with optimizing global 
social welfare. Rather, we take the point of view of donor and recipient countries and ask what 
their social welfare functions imply for the impact of different financial transfers. The main 
difference between our study and earlier papers on international transfers is threefold:  (i) the 
explicit ethical motivation for giving transfers, (ii) the broad set of transfers we study and (iii) 
the treatment of market imperfections and institutional barriers for transfers. It is worth 
elaborating on each of these features.  
 
First, in terms of the ethical motivation of transfers, most of the existing literature on financial 
transfers focuses on their strategic value, that is, their merit in securing an international 
agreement (see e.g., Barrett, 2003, 2007 and Hong and Karp, 2012, on forming international 
environmental agreements). Already in the 1990s, Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Kverndokk 
(1994) argued that side payments mainly from OECD countries to non-OECD countries would 
be an effective policy instrument for making a limited treaty significant. Eyckmans and Tulkens 
(2003) show that a proportional surplus- sharing rule can stabilize a grand coalition and secure 
the first-best global climate policy, and Carraro et al. (2005) demonstrate the importance of 
monetary transfers as strategic instruments to foster stability of voluntary climate agreements. 
Further, Hoel (2001) argues that monetary transfers are also important to reduce carbon leakage, 
while Chatterjee et al. (2003) and Bretschger and Suphaphiphat (2014) study transfers that 
promote economic growth.  
 
In contrast, the basic tenet in our paper is that transfers reflect the ethical beliefs of those making 
them. That is, transfers are not made primarily for strategic reasons, but because people in 
developed countries care about the welfare of people in developing countries.
1
 We also assume 
                                                 
1
 The Copenhagen Accord describes transfers that should “address the needs of developing countries”, see UNFCCC 
(2010). 
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that these beliefs can be expressed in an appropriately specified welfare function, and study how 
the level and composition of financial flows depend on the ethical beliefs of developed countries. 
Fairness issues related to climate finance have been studied by, e.g., Grasso (2010) and Pittel and 
Rübbelke (2013a). Grasso (2010) studies adaptation finance from the framework of procedural 
and distributive justice. Pittel and Rübbelke (2013a) focus on how climate finance may support 
an optimal climate outcome, arguing that international adaptation transfers could help address 
the perceived unfairness associated with historical emissions. Hence, such transfers may help 
achieving an international climate agreement. For a further discussion of the ethical dimensions 
of climate change see Kolstad et al. (2014), Stern (2014a, b) and Kverndokk and Rose (2008). 
 
A second distinguishing feature of our paper is that it analyzes the full range of available 
transfers, including transfers for mitigation, adaptation and development. In that respect the 
paper is part of a recent literature on the interplay between adaptation and mitigation (see for 
instance Ingham et al. 2007; Tulkens and van Steenberghe 2009; Buob and Stephan 2011, 2013; 
Ebert and Welsch 2012; Heuson et al., 2012; Bréchet et al. 2013). A recurring insight from this 
body of work is that while the benefits of mitigation are non-excludable, the benefits of 
adaptation are often excludable. This means adaptation is primarily a private good and the 
benefits accrue only to the nation doing the adaptation investment (Kane and Shogren, 2000; 
Barrett, 2008).
2
 Thus, nations should have the incentives to do the appropriate adaptation 
investment themselves in contrast to mitigation. We should thus expect at least some crowding 
out of adaptation transfers as countries pursue their optimal adaptation strategies.  
 
Another issue in this literature is whether adaptation and mitigation are substitutes or 
complements (Buob and Stephan, 2013). If the two measures are substitutes, a reduction in the 
cost of one (say, lower adaptation costs) will reduce demand for the other (less mitigation, since 
additional low-cost adaptation can reduce the effects of climate change). If the two measures are 
complements, a reduction in costs will increase demand for both measures. There are examples 
where this is the case, such as the preservation of peat lands and mangrove forests, which 
simultaneously sequesters carbon and reduces impacts. However, in most cases mitigation and 
                                                 
2
 There are examples of adaptation actions with regional public goods features, such as the management of 
international water systems, and global public good features, such as measures to deal with climate refugees 
(Heuson et al., 2012), but we can treat these as exceptions from the rule. 
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adaptation seem to be substitutes (Tol, 2005; Ingham et al., 2005), which is the assumption we 
make in this paper.
3
 
 
A third important feature of our paper lies in its assumptions about barriers and market 
imperfections. In the absence of any market imperfections – the climate change externality is 
fully addressed, there are no financing barriers, transfers are cost-free etc. – the optimal transfer 
strategy is easy. Donor countries transfer income in accordance with their ethical beliefs and 
recipient countries allocate funds between income, mitigation and adaptation to maximize their 
welfare. We take this (unrealistic) case as the starting point, before exploring financing and 
institutional constraints (see also Bretschger and Suphaphiphat 2014).  
 
The ambition of the international climate negotiations is to achieve a legally binding and 
universal climate agreement for all nations. An interesting question is how this ambition interacts 
with mitigation transfers both from the recipient side and the donor side. A universally binding 
international agreement is therefore a premise for our analysis, although we do not prescribe how 
constraining the emissions limits might be. An alternative to a carbon constraint is studied by 
Pittel and Rübbelke (2013b), who develop a two-region model, similar to ours, to explore the 
merit of financial adaptation transfers that are conditional on mitigation efforts. Conditional 
transfers are also studied in this paper. However, we also ask whether transfers may be optimal 
for donor countries without being conditional.  
 
We then introduce financing constraints. Dividing the world into only two regions, rich and poor, 
is of course a simplification as the developing region consists of countries at different income 
levels, which may face different financing barriers. We study the case of low income countries, 
which may face a consumption constraint as they seek to fulfill a subsistence level condition. If 
they are constrained in available resources we find that the effects of transfers are different. 
While credit constraints are also studied in Bretschger and Suphaphiphat (2014), they do not 
study adaptation transfers. 
                                                 
3
 If mitigation and adaptation are complements, the poor region will boost its mitigation when it receives more 
adaptation support. This additional mitigation is beneficial for the rich region, given the public good nature of 
mitigation. So in that case, there are strong incentives for the rich region to voluntarily support adaptation in the 
poor region. Note that this argument is valid when there is no binding climate agreement. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out our theoretical model. It features a two-
period leader-follower game of transfers from North to South with utility functions that include 
the welfare in the other region. We then use this framework to study a series of questions relating 
to the interplay of development aid and official finance for mitigation and adaptation.  
 
The game is solved by first analyzing the problem of the follower, that is, decision making in the 
South. Section 3 studies the effect of official transfers on the mitigation decisions of the South, 
while section 4 studies the impact on adaptation. Section 5 introduces a financing constraint and 
analyzes the special case of a (least-developed) country whose ability to spend money on climate 
change is constrained by the need to maintain a subsistence level of consumption.  
 
We turn to the leader and study decision making in the North in section 6, where we analyze the 
incentive of the North to offer adaptation, mitigation and development transfers, bearing in mind 
the strategic reaction of the South observed in sections 3 and 4. Section 7 studies the same 
question but with an institutional constraint: the efficiency of transfers varies, that is, a varying 
fraction of funding is lost in the course of the transfer. Finally, section 8 concludes. 
 
2. A two-period model of transfers 
Our model is structured as a leader-follower game between two regions over two periods ( 0,1t 
). The two regions are called North ( j N ) and South ( j S ), where North is a rich region and 
South is poor. Each region produces an exogenous output 
t
jy , which results in greenhouse gas 
emissions 
t
je .
4
 The combined emissions from both regions result in climate change damage, 
which reduces output in period 1. Damage in period 0 is assumed to be negligible. 
 
In period 0 each region chooses the amount it wishes to invest in mitigation technology jm  and 
adaptation technology ja . The benefit of adaptation is reduced impacts from climate change in 
period 1. We assume that climate change damage in country j, jD , increases in aggregated 
                                                 
4
 Thus, we implicitly assume that real capital investments are made optimally. 
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emissions, is proportional to output, and a fraction, j , of this damage can be avoided through 
adaptation. Investing in adaptation has decreasing returns:  0 1j ja   with 0j   and 
0j  . This specification, while simple,is in line with the literature on integrated assessment 
modelling (see, e.g., Fankhauser, 1994; Kverndokk, 1994; Tol, 2002; Nordhaus, 2008; de Bruin, 
Dellink and Tol, 2009; de Bruin, Dellink and Agrawala, 2009; for a critique see Pindyck, 2013), 
and covers both market and non-market damages.
5
 
 
Mitigation capital is long-lived so that the choice of jm  determines emissions over both periods. 
Emissions are proportional to output, that is,  t tj j j je m y , where  j jm  can be interpreted as 
the emission-to-output ratio. Thus, the benefit of investing in mitigation is a lower emission 
intensity of output. We assume that mitigation investment has decreasing returns (equivalently, 
the abatement costs functions is convex): 0j   and 0j  .
6
 
Each region has its own emission constraints, which one may think of as being part of an 
international agreement to constrain emissions over both regions: 
 
(1)     0 1  0 1  ;     ;       ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆN N N S S S N Se e e e e e e e e        
 
For simplicity we assume that there is no interaction (e.g., through carbon trading) between the 
two emission spaces. The respective emissions constraints apply separately to each region, 
although emissions are fungible across time periods.
7
 
8
  
                                                 
5
 For a discussion of the case where consumption and the environment are specified as two different goods in the 
utility function, see Hoel and Sterner (2007). 
6
 Buob and Stephan (2013) define mitigation and adaptation as substitutes if adaptation negatively affects the 
marginal productivity of mitigation. To see that this is the case in our model, we define a “green GDP function” as 
in Buob and Stephan;    ( , , ) 1 ( ) ( )F y a m y a D m y y    . Based on this, the condition for substitution is 
fulfilled as 
2 2( , , ) ' ' ' 0F y a m m a D y      . 
7
 This is not important for the conclusions in this paper, but it simplifies the analyses as we get only one shadow 
price of carbon in the region, see section 3 below. 
8
 Eyckmans et al (2014) explore a global carbon constraint where carbon is traded between regions, thus introducing 
a strategic element into the game. Another alternative would be to associate the benefit of mitigation directly with 
reduced damage. This too would introduce strategic considerations into the model and make it difficult to 
distinguish the equity case for transfers from the strategic case. Moreover, our representation is not unrealistic. Very 
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The North can make three types of transfer in period 0:  
 a productive capital transfer (development assistance), iT , which will increase the 
available output (and emissions) of the South in period 1,  
 a mitigation transfer, mT , which helps the South reduce its emissions in both periods, 
 an adaptation transfer, aT , which augments the adaptation capital available to the South.  
The transfers introduce some intra- and intergenerational tradeoffs. Mitigation (and mitigation 
support) has an immediate and lasting impact because it lowers the emission intensity in both 
periods. Adaptation and productive capital support however, are subject to a time delay. Today’s 
investment only pays off in the next period. Hence, we assume that changing the productive 
capital base of a country requires more time than curbing its emission intensity. Increasing the 
adaptation capacity only affects the future as the damage is only felt in the longer term.
9
  
 
The output that is left after transfers and investments in mitigation and adaptation in period 0 is 
consumed. The consumption levels in each region and period, 
t
jc , and the corresponding 
emissions, 
t
je , can be specified as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Consumption and emissions levels in each region and period. 
 Period 0 (now) Period 1 (future) 
N (North) 0 0 m a i
N N N Nc y m a T T T     
 
 0 0N N N Ne m y  
   1 1ˆ1 1N N N N Nc a D e y      
 
 1 1N N N Ne m y  
S (South) 0 0
S S S Sc y m a  
 
 0 0mS S S Se m T y   
   1 1ˆ1 1 a iS S S S Sc a T D e y T           
 
 1 1m iS S S Se m T y T       
 
                                                                                                                                                             
few countries are large enough to influence global emissions significantly. For most, the incentive to reduce 
emissions comes from an exogenously agreed target, rather than the possibility to reduce damage directly.  
9
 In reality, there will also be quick wins in improving adaptation capacity and productivity. At the same time, some 
mitigation efforts will only curb emission intensity in the long run. We abstract from these possibilities mainly 
because it allows us to keep the model tractable. 
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The final, crucial element of the model is each region’s utility function. We assume that both 
regions gain utility from consumption (that also includes feedback from the environment). For 
simplicity we assume linear utility functions, and we can write the intertemporal utility function 
of the South as:
10
  
 
(2)  0 1 0 1,S S S S S SU c c c c   
 
where 
S  is the consumption discount factor of the South, expressing the intergenerational equity 
preferences of the region. 
 
To be able to study transfers from North to South that are not motivated by strategic reasons, we 
assume that the North has social preferences. It cares about the intragenerational distribution of 
consumption, that is, the distribution of consumption between the regions. One way of doing this 
is to follow Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and assume that the North expresses inequality aversion in 
consumption;
11
 people in the North dislike that the South is poorer than them, but would dislike 
it even more if the South were richer.
12
  In representative democracies, these preferences get 
reflected in the actions of policy makers (Lee et al. 2004). We can therefore assume that the 
Fehr-Schmidt utility functions of voters work through in the welfare function of the country as a 
whole (Kverndokk et al. 2014). 
 
Obviously, as North is the richer region, we have N Sc c . The utility function of the North can 
then be written as:  
 
                                                 
10
 A linear utility function is of course a simplification. However, we may argue that transfers are not so big that 
they lead to large changes in the consumption levels of the regions, thus the marginal utility is relatively constant. 
With this representation, the marginal utility from a change in consumption is equal to one. 
11
 We could also introduce the inequality preferences in the welfare function of the South as in Kverndokk et al. 
(2014). This would give preferences for a higher consumption level in the South. However, as will be obvious from 
the discussions in Sections 3 and 5 below, equity preferences will not affect the optimal mitigation and adaptation 
levels, and inequality aversion in the South would not matter for our analysis. 
12
 The general case would be       0 1, max ,0 max ,0 , , ,N N S N S N N S j j j jU c c c c c c c c c c j N S           , 
where   is a parameter representing the negative feeling of being worse off than the South, while μ is the parameter 
representing the negative feeling of being better off. We then have   . The second part of the welfare function 
equals zero as 
N Sc c . 
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(3)    0 1, ( ) (1 ) , , ,N N S N N S N S j j j jU c c c c c c c c c c j N S             
 
where 0   is a parameter expressing the intragenerational preferences of the North, while N  is 
the discount rate of the North, expressing its intergenerational preferences. 
 
From (3) we see that 1   is required for consumption in the North to add to the North’s 
welfare. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that consumption in the North adds more to the 
utility of the North than consumption in the South. Thus, we set 1 2  .
13
 
 
3. Financial transfers and mitigation in the South 
The game is solved by backward induction; we first look at decisions by the follower, that is, the 
South. The model is structured so that the South’s adaptation and mitigation decisions are 
independent from each other, and we start with mitigation. That is, we first explore how the need 
to reduce emissions affects how the South reacts to official financial flows from the North. 
 
All optimization problems and first order conditions are specified in Annex 1. Let S  be the 
shadow price on carbon for the South. Assuming the emissions constraint is binding, we find the 
optimal level of mitigation in the South from the necessary first-order condition (FOC) for an 
interior solution: 
 
(4)  0 11 /   iS S S Sy y T         
 
                                                 
13
 We could also introduce a consumption transfer from North to South in both periods as a means to reduce 
consumption inequality. However, as we have assumed that 1 2  , no interior solution would be possible from the 
optimization problem, and there would not be any consumption transfer between the two regions. This is because 
utility is linear in consumption, and the North will always prefer one extra consumption unit to itself than to the 
South. A transfer is only welfare improving for the North if it increases consumption more in the South than it 
reduces consumption in the North. To be more precise:  1S NC C        . Note, however, that with a concave utility 
function, it may be welfare improving for the North to transfer consumption to the South if the consumption level is 
so high that the direct marginal utility of consumption (not considering inequality aversion) is very small. Thus, in 
this case we may find an optimal consumption transfer. Also, if 0   so that North does not care about the welfare 
level of the South, there will not be any consumption transfer. The reason is that the consumption transfer has no 
strategic effect. The only reason to transfer consumption is that the North cares about the welfare of the South. 
11 
 
The FOC tells us that the shadow price of carbon, 𝜆𝑆, is determined by the marginal cost of 
mitigation, measured over both periods. Equation (4) together with the binding emissions 
constraint  0 1 ˆ  S S Se e e   from equation (1) constitute a two-equation system with two endogenous 
variables Sm  and S , which are functions of income 
0 1,S Sy y , transfers ,
i mT T  and the emissions 
constraint ˆSe . Note that adaptation is not present in the FOC for mitigation effort, which is why 
we can study the mitigation decision separately. 
 
We solve the system by totally differentiating the two equations. Expressed in matrix form this 
yields: 
(5)   
2 01/
 
10
ˆ
m
S S S S iS S S
S S S SS S
S
dT
dm yy
dT
d yy
de
  
  
 
         
               
 
 
 
where 0 1 i
S S Sy y y T    is total undiscounted income over both periods. We find that: 
 
(6)   
1
  0;   1 ; 0.
ˆ  
S S S S
m i
S S S S S
dm dm dm
de y dT dT y

 

    
 
 
 
The first expression confirms that a more lenient emissions constraint in the South leads to 
reduced mitigation effort. The second expression suggests that a dedicated mitigation transfer 
completely crowds out the South’s own mitigation efforts. Since the cap on emissions is fixed, 
the transfer allows the South to free up its own resources for consumption. As a corollary there is 
no additional mitigation in the South. A binding emissions constraint in the South renders 
mitigation transfers ineffective, i.e.
14
 
 
(7)      1  0S SS Sm m
de dm
y
dT dT

 
    
. 
                                                 
14
 It seems likely that a global agreement would be heterogeneous. Some countries may have restrictions on absolute 
emission levels as in equation (1), while other countries may have restrictions on carbon intensity, i.e. σ. If the latter 
is true, we have ( )j j jm  . However, this will not change conclusions in the no-trade case as this also defines 
the mitigation level as a function of the exogenous target. 
12 
 
 
The final expression in equation (6) shows the effect of development assistance on mitigation in 
the South. It suggests that additional aid will trigger further mitigation. This is because a 
productive income transfer leads to higher output and therefore more emissions, and additional 
mitigation is needed to remain within the carbon constraint. Again, the presence of an emissions 
constraint makes the transfer less effective, in the sense that development assistance now leads to 
a lower increase in utility in the South, and therefore also the North.
15
 To see this we 
differentiate the utility function of the South with respect to development assistance: 
 
(8)           1 ˆ1   )  (S S S S Si i aS
dU dm
D
dT
a e
T
T
d
        
 
The second term of the equation represents the increase in period 1 consumption that a 
productive transfer would normally have. The first term is negative and reflects the reduction in 
consumption due to the need for more mitigation. Because wellbeing in the South features in the 
utility function of the North, utility in the North is affected in the same way. Note that the effect 
on period 1 consumption depends on climate damages. We will return to this issue in the next 
section. 
 
Equations (6) to (8) give rise to the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1: Mitigation and development transfers become less effective if the South has a 
binding emissions constraint, in the sense that the transfers result in less additional mitigation or 
additional consumption, respectively, than the same transfer in the absence of a constraint. This 
is because each of the transfers focuses on only one objective (emissions cuts and higher output, 
respectively), and the South will redeploy its own resources to establish its preferred balance 
between the two goals.  
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 However, Bretschger and Suphaphiphat (2014) find that a mitigation transfer may be better for the South than 
development aid due to its effects on economic growth. 
13 
 
If the North wishes to preserve the full effect of development transfers
16
 it will have to recognize 
the twin importance of both output growth and emissions cuts. The North may then devise a 
combined package of transfers T  that includes both development and mitigation assistance. In 
particular, a package that combines each dollar of development assistance with S SS y   
dollars of mitigation transfer (see equation (6) and recall that S   is negative), would be 
emissions-neutral and not require any further adjustments in the South: 
 
(9)   0; 0i mS S S
S S
de dm
T T T
y dT dT




   

  
 
We can think of such a package as low-carbon development assistance (say, rural electrification 
based on renewable energy) rather than traditional, high-carbon development aid (access to fossil 
fuel-based energy), where the incremental cost of the clean solution constitutes the mitigation 
transfer. The presence of an emissions constraint in the South thus strengthens the case for low-
carbon development aid, and raises questions about development support for high-carbon 
projects like coal. 
 
If the North is intent on increasing mitigation in the South beyond the emissions constraint ˆSe , it 
may wish to structure mitigation transfers as “matching grants”, where for each dollar the South 
spends on mitigation, the North would pay an additional m  dollars for further mitigation.17 This 
would provide an incentive to reduce emissions in the South beyond what its carbon constraint 
requires. Defining 1 mS Sm m     as the total mitigation level in the South, it is easy to show 
that there is still crowding out but at a lower rate:  
 
(10) 1 0 1m m m mS S S S Sdm dm m d dm d m                 . 
 
Hence, the effect of a slight increase of the matching grant rate (from say 10% to 11%) is a 
decrease in mitigation expenditure in the South of 1 mSm     . In order to make this 
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 Note that this will not necessarily follow from the optimization problem of the North, see Section 5. 
17
 Again, this may not necessarily be an optimal policy for the North. 
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comparable to the effect of the direct grant (which is measured in monetary terms), we have to 
divide by 
Sm  in equation (10). Therefore, the effect of a slight change in the matching grant is 
given by  1 1 1,0m      , showing that there is incomplete crowding out in the matching 
grant case. 
 
An incomplete crowding out implies that more is spent on mitigation measures and emissions 
fall. As the emissions constraint is no longer binding, the shadow price of the constraint is zero 
and additional mitigation is undertaken if marginal mitigation costs are less than the marginal 
benefit, which is τm, i.e., the additional revenue the South gets from the matching grant.18 
However, unlike in the case of low-carbon development assistance, the matching grant will not 
result in a welfare maximizing allocation of resources from the perspective of the South as it 
would allocate resources differently without the matching grant restriction. 
 
We summarize these findings in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: The North can respond to the impact that an emissions constraint in the South has 
on the effectiveness of transfers by switching to a low-carbon form of development assistance 
and / or by offering mitigation assistance in the form of a matching grant. The former would 
ensure that the twin objectives of output growth and emissions cuts are met simultaneously. The 
latter would encourage the South to undertake additional mitigation beyond what its emissions 
constraint requires.  
 
4. Financial transfers and adaptation in the South 
We now turn to the adaptation decision of the South and explore how the adaptation in the South 
depends on transfers from the North. From the optimization specified in Annex 1, we find the 
following FOC:  
 
(11)     1ˆ 1a iS S S S Sa T D e y T        
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 Note that there is an additional effect as the damage in period 1 is no longer given. However, for an individual 
country this effect will probably be negligible, see footnote 8. 
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The optimal adaptation effort is found by equalizing the marginal benefits of adaption (the left 
hand side) and its marginal costs (the right hand side). The FOC determines adaptation effort as 
an implicit function of adaptation and development transfers and the global emission cap, 
 ˆ, ,a iSa T T e . 
 
To determine the signs of the exogenous factors (that is, the impacts of transfers and the 
emissions constraint on the adaptation level in the South), we totally differentiate equation (11): 
 
(12) 1 1 ˆ 0a i i iS S S S S S S S Sda dT D y T D y T de D dT                      
 
It follows straightforwardly that  
 
(13)  ˆ, , 0
ˆ ˆ
a i S S S
S
S S
da D
a e T T
e de D


 
  

 
 
A higher global cap on emissions will cause the South to adapt more as the marginal benefit to 
adaptation is higher. An interpretation of this is that a region would adapt less if a climate 
agreement is reached. Thus more mitigation would mean less adaptation as in our model 
mitigation and adaptation are substitutes. 
 
If follows also that 
 
(14)  ˆ, , 1a i SSa a
da
a e T T
T dT

  

. 
 
That is, additional adaptation support completely crowds out the South’s own adaptation effort –
the South decreases its own adaptation effort by the same amount. In the same way as for 
mitigation, additional adaptation support frees up resources that the South prefers to use for 
consumption. The reason for this is seen from the first order condition given by equation (11). 
Adaptation transfers do not address any exogenous constraints to adaptation but simply offer 
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additional adaptation resources. But since the benefit from adaption is the same before and after 
the transfer, it will be optimal for the South to maintain its original adaptation level. This is in 
line with the literature claiming that the benefits of adaptation are excludable, see, e.g., Buob and 
Stephan (2013). 
 
As in the case of mitigation transfers, the North could increase  adaptation in the South, and thus 
reduce damage in the South, by using a “matching grant” form of support. As before this would 
lead to incomplete crowding out, but as it changes the allocation of resources, it would result in a 
welfare loss for the South. 
 
This gives us the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: Adaptation capital transfer from the North to South will completely crowd out 
adaptation investments in the South, unless a matching grant support function is used, but this 
will not be a welfare maximizing allocation of resources for the South. 
 
To study the effect of development assistance on adaptation, it follows from (12) that 
 
(15)  
  1 1
ˆ, , 0a i S S S S SSi i i i
S S S S S S
da D
a e T T
T dT D y T y T
  
  
  
   
          
,  
 
That is, productive capital support leads the South to increase its adaptation effort. Intuitively, by 
increasing income in the South, more value is at risk in the region due to climate change.
19
 This 
gives an incentive to increase adaptation efforts. Note that this effect hinges on the assumption 
that damages are proportional to output, a standard assumption in economic studies as mentioned 
in Section 2. The result can be stated in a Proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: An increase in development assistance will increase the adaptation level of the 
South. 
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 In addition, higher income may lead to higher demand for climate protection, but we do not model this income 
effect. 
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As seen from equations (6) and (15), increasing development assistance has a positive impact on 
both mitigation and adaptation effort in the South. This is in contrast to climate finance, which 
does not alter overall adaptation and mitigation levels. However, the result is due to the 
assumption that there are no barriers. There are no limits to the South’s ability to allocate 
resources between mitigation, adaptation and consumption. We review this assumption in the 
next section. Institutional barriers in the North will be discussed further in Section 7.   
 
5. Financial transfers when the South is income-constrained 
Up to now, we have assumed that the South is sufficiently affluent that it can invest some of its 
resources in adaptation or mitigation. We now relax this assumption by requiring that 
consumption in the initial period should be at least equal to some minimal subsistence level c . 
This condition may be binding for a least-developed country. 
 
The South’s optimization problem is now given by: 
 
(16) 
0 1 0 0 1
,
ˆmax s.t. and
S Sm a S S S S S S S S
U c c c c e e e       
 
Associating a Lagrange multiplier   to the minimal consumption requirement and S  with the 
emission constraint as before, we can write the FOC for optimal mitigation (assuming an interior 
solution
20
) as follows: 
 
(17)    0 11    0iS S S Sy y T             
 
The first term denotes the marginal cost of a dollar invested in mitigation in the first period: one 
unit of consumption forgone plus the shadow price of the subsistence requirement. The second 
term measures the marginal return of that extra mitigation investment which depends on the 
shadow value of the emissions constraint. The FOC for optimal adaptation efforts is given by: 
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 We can do this because we have assumed that the marginal benefits of the first units of mitigation- and adaptation 
investments are unbounded. 
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(18)   11 0iS S S SD y T            
 
Now, the first term stands for the marginal adaptation cost and the shadow price of the minimal 
subsistence consumption level. The second term stands for the marginal benefit, i.e., reduction in 
remaining climate change damages. Compared to the unconstrained case (equation (4) for 
mitigation and equation (11) for adaptation), we see that marginal cost of investment will be 
higher in the constrained case (given that the constraint is binding). Hence, the South will 
mitigate and adapt less if it is constrained in consumption in the initial period which is very 
intuitive. They would like to mitigate and adapt more but they cannot because otherwise they 
would starve to death. 
 
The comparative statics and derivations are shown in Annex 2. When both the emissions and 
consumption constraints are binding, we find exactly the same results for mitigation as in the 
unconstrained case discussed earlier. In particular, mitigation support is completely crowded out, 
adaptation support has no impact on mitigation efforts, productive capital support leads to higher 
mitigation (in order to compensate for higher emissions), a more lenient emission constraint 
implies less mitigation, and the minimal consumption level (and hence a pure transfer of 
consumption) has no impact on the mitigation decision. 
 
The comparative statics for adaptation by the South are, however, different from the 
unconstrained case. First, extra mitigation support leads to more adaptation in the constrained 
case (remember it did not affect adaptation in the unconstrained case). The transfer of mitigation 
capital leads to complete crowding out of mitigation as the South will lower its own effort by 
exactly the same amount. However, this frees resources that can be invested in adaptation which 
was previously constrained. 
 
Secondly, extra adaptation support has no impact on the adaptation choice of the South in the 
sense that the South does not change its own adaptation investments. The reason is that the South 
19 
 
was constrained in adaptation. Hence, the support alleviates the constraint and increases to total 
adaptation capital of the South. 
 
Thirdly, productive capital support leads to higher second period emissions which have to be 
compensated by higher mitigation if the emission constraint is binding. This implies that 
resources should be drained away from adaptation in order to satisfy the consumption constraint. 
Note that mitigation investments have to be made in the first period and, therefore, have to be at 
the expense of adaptation investments as the consumption constraint is binding. In the second 
period, production will increase, but that will only have an impact on consumption as no 
investments are made in the second period. Thus, in our model, traditional development 
assistance leads to lower adaptation investments in the poorest countries. Recall that this was 
different in the unconstrained case, in which the South reacted with extra adaptation efforts when 
receiving development assistance. 
 
Fourthly, a more lenient global carbon constraint results in more adaptation investment in the 
South because the marginal benefit of adaptation increases. This effect is the same as in the 
unconstrained case. 
 
A final result is that simply transferring consumption goods (i.e., relaxing the consumption 
constraint) would lead to higher adaptation. The additional consumption is used to direct more 
resources to constrained adaptation investments.
21
  
 
Proposition 5: If the South is very poor (i.e. constrained to subsistence consumption in the initial 
period), adaptation can be boosted by providing (1) targeted adaptation support, (2) mitigation 
support, or (3) direct consumption transfers. All three routes are equally efficient at boosting 
adaptation. Productive capital support leads however to lower adaptation. 
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 Thus, as opposed to the result in the main model in Section 2, a consumption transfer may be optimal in this case. 
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6. The financial transfer decisions of the North 
To complete the solution to our leader-follower game, we now turn to the problem of the North.  
First, note that the emissions constraint in the North given by equation (1) determines the need 
for mitigation in the North, i.e., the optimal level of emissions  follows directly from the 
emissions constraint and is unaffected by the transfers to the South. 
 
Next, to decide on its adaptation level and the transfers to the South, the North wants to 
maximize its intertemporal welfare function, given all restrictions from Section 2 and subject to 
its adaptation level ( Na ) and transfers ( , ,
a i mT T T ). The North takes the optimal responses of the 
South into account when deciding on the transfers, see also Buob and Stephan (2013). That is, 
the North decides on transfers, and the South responds to these transfers. The North has the 
information to calculate the responses of the South. 
 
The optimization problems and the FOCs are given in Annex 1. The first order condition for 
adaptation transfers can be written as: 
 
(19)  1 ˆ1 1i SS S S S a
a
y T D e
T
  
 
        
 
 
This shows that the marginal cost of the transfer in the North, weighted with the equity weight 
(left hand side), should equal the benefit of increased consumption in the South in the next 
period, also weighted with the equity weight (right hand side). But from (14) we know that 
1S
a
a
T

 

 and the adaptation transfer completely crowds out the South’s adaptation effort if there 
are no other constraints. In this case we see that (19) does not hold, and there is no interior 
solution. Thus, it will not be optimal for the North to transfer adaptation capital to the South.
22
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 Note that an adaptation transfer in this case would be equal to a pure consumption transfer. As discussed in 
footnote 13, a consumption transfer will not be optimal with a linear utility function. However, with a concave 
utility function we would get an interior solution, and it would be optimal with an adaptation transfer even if the 
adaptation level in the South did not increase. The reason is that consumption in South would increase and the 
inequality between the two sectors would be lower. This would increase the utility of the North as they express 
inequality aversion.  
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However, if there are constraints attached to the adaptation transfers, such that for every dollar 
used on adaptation in the South, the North transfers τa dollars (a matching grant), we know from 
Section 3 that the crowding out is not complete. Using a matching grant may, therefore, give an 
interior solution of the optimization problem and a positive adaptation transfer from the North to 
the South will occur. The magnitude of this transfer is increasing with the equity weight put on 
the utility of the South, and the transfer would be zero if the weight is set to zero. 
 
If the South is constrained in consumption (Section 5), we know that 0S
a
da
dT
 , see Annex 2. 
Equation (19) now becomes: 
 
(20)   1 ˆ1 iS S S Sy T D e        
 
Thus, as we do not have crowding out, it may be optimal for the North to transfer adaptation 
capital to the South. 
 
We know from Section 3 that there is full crowding out of mitigation transfers to the South. 
Using this in the first order condition for mitigation transfers in Annex 1, we get the same result 
as for adaptation transfers; there is no interior solution to mitigation transfers and the optimal 
level is equal to zero. The mitigation transfer would just work as a consumption transfer, which 
is not optimal with the linear utility function. This also holds if the South is income-constrained.  
 
This gives us the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6: Due to the complete crowding out of adaptation and mitigation in the South from 
adaptation and mitigation transfers respectively, these would work as pure income transfers, 
which will not be optimal with a linear utility function. However, if the South is income-
constrained, adaptation transfers would be optimal for the North as they will increase the total 
adaptation capital in the South. 
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The optimal level of development assistance follows from its FOC in Annex 1:
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(21)      1 ˆ ˆ1 1 1 1i aS S S S S S S S s Si i
m a
y T D e a T D e
T T
       
                           
 
 
Development assistance has impacts on the utility of the North via changes in the mitigation and 
adaptation efforts in the South, as well as the income increase in the South as the region gets 
richer. Thus, there may be an interior solution, meaning there may exist an optimal level of 
development assistance. 
 
For the case where the South is income-constrained, we may still have an interior solution, but 
should note that the sign of S
i
a
T


 now turns from positive to negative, which has an impact on the 
size of the transfer. Whether, transfers increase or decrease is undetermined as adaptation in the 
South has both a positive (reduces utility in the first period) and negative (increases utility in the 
second period) impact on the intertemporal utility of the poor region.  
 
7. The decisions of the North when financial transfers are inefficient  
We next introduce an institutional barrier. In particular we study the case where international 
transfers are subject to  “leakage”, that is, a fraction of transfers does not reach the intended 
beneficiary. With weak or corrupt institutions, which are prevalent in many developing 
countries, money may disappear along the road. 
 
In our model, the efficiency of transfers can be modeled in different ways. For instance, the α- 
and σ-functions describe how adaptation measures and mitigation measures are transferred into 
reduced damage and emissions respectively. Thus, these functions also describe the efficiency of 
these transformations. As an example, the α-function may describe the costs of adaptation. 
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 Note again that the transfer is only welfare improving, i.e., there exists an interior solution, if the cost of the 
transfer in the North (reduced consumption) is less than the increased consumption in the South that follows from 
the transfer. 
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To model how much money actually reaches the targets, we can introduce efficiency parameters 
0 1, , ,jb j a i m   . This means that the North may pay for more than what reaches the South. 
Thus, while the North’s optimization problem is unchanged, these parameters need to be 
incorporated in South’s optimization problem. 
 
The introduction of these efficiency parameters only has a modest impact on the qualitative 
conclusions.  However, there will be less crowding out of adaptation and mitigation capital if 
less money reaches the South, i.e., there is only crowding out of the actual transfer that reaches 
the target. The optimal sizes of transfers will of course be affected by leakage.  
 
It is also worth exploring to what extent our conclusions hinge on the assumption that 
development assistance is efficient. In our model development assistance has a positive effect on 
production in the South; the growth potential of development aid is not crowded out. Some 
studies suggest that aid does not necessary raise capital stocks in developing countries, and that 
the outcome depends on domestic policies and institutions, see e.g., Dollar and Easterly (1999); 
Easterly and Pfutze (2008), but there are also more optimistic views on the effects of 
development aid (e.g. Sachs (2005); Banerjee and Duflo (2011)). Temple (2010) examines the 
conditions under which foreign aid will be effective in raising growth. Based on the evidence, he 
finds that aid can be effective, and that a hypothesis that aid may be harmful does not have 
backing. Thus, while we have modeled the effect of aid in a simple way, we can conclude that as 
long as aid is given in a way that promotes growth (not complete crowding out), the effect on 
mitigation and adaptation effort in the developing countries will be positive in our main model. 
 
Another of our assumptions is more crucial. In the main model with linear utility functions, it is 
not optimal for the North to transfer mitigation and adaptation capital as we have full crowding 
out and the transfers go to consumption. With concave utility functions, in contrast, the option 
for the North would be to increase Southern consumption by either transferring consumption 
goods directly, or transferring adaptation or mitigation capital. The choice would depend on the 
transaction costs for each transfer, akin to the “leaky bucket” problem; i.e., the relative efficiency 
loss in distribution. As a consequence, transferring adaptation or mitigation capital may give 
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different effects on consumption and on who receives the consumption good than a direct 
transfer of the good itself. 
 
8. Conclusions  
This paper discusses the interplay of different types of donor assistance to developing countries: 
development assistance to boost output and income, mitigation support to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, and adaptation support to increase resilience to climate risks. We assume that the 
motivation for these transfers is derived solely from the North’s concern about well-being in the 
South. Our model does not include any strategic reasons for mitigation and adaptation transfers, 
such as the need to secure a global agreement on emissions, or concerns about international trade 
where countries specializing in an adaptation or mitigation technology seek to expand their 
market. 
 
The main model does not contain any market distortions that are not internalized. In particular, 
there are no barriers (such as poor institutions) to effective adaptation, effective economic 
management and the transfer of funds, and we assume a binding global emissions constraint to 
address the climate change externality. We may associate this situation with middle income 
countries, which tend to have fairly advanced institutions.  
 
We find that under these assumptions isolated transfers aimed solely at development, mitigation 
or adaptation are relatively inefficient: A large part of their intended effect (to increase income, 
reduce emissions, or boost climate-resilience) dissipates as the South reacts to the transfers by 
reallocating its own resources until it has established the mitigation, adaptation and consumption 
balance that optimizes its welfare. In essence, climate change finance works as a pure income 
transfer and any impacts on mitigation and adaptation are indirect, triggered by the softer budget 
constraint. The main motivation for transfers in this context would have to be strategic, a topic 
not studied in this paper. 
 
If the North wishes to change the balance between mitigation, adaptation and consumption in the 
South it needs to structure its transfers as “matching grants”, which vary according to the South’s 
own level of funding. In our model such conditional funding would not lead to a welfare 
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maximizing allocation of resources. Matching grants could only be justified if the North is 
concerned uniquely about climate security in the South, rather than welfare more broadly.  
 
Development aid can boost both adaptation and mitigation, but this will in turn reduce other 
capital investments which may have been the initial aim for this transfer. Ultimately if the North 
wants to preserve the full effect of development transfers, it may recognize how climate change 
complicates welfare maximization and provide an integrated transfer package that addresses the 
combined climate and development requirements of the South. The development community has 
started to call this climate-smart development – or, more catchily green growth (Jacobs, 2013; 
World Bank, 2012; Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011). 
 
The result changes if we introduce a binding income constraint. We can think of this as the 
situation of low income countries, which have to secure a subsistence level of income before 
funds can be allocated for climate change purposes. In this situation financial transfers can have 
some unexpected consequences. For example, a mitigation transfer may lead to higher levels of 
adaptation because the South’s own mitigation budget is freed up and can be reallocated. In 
contrast, an adaptation transfer will have the desired effect by easing the constraint on adaptation 
and increasing climate resilience.  
 
This suggests that adaptation support could usefully be targeted at countries that are income (and 
therefore adaptation) constrained. In addition to the crowding-out argument made here, there are 
also compelling equity reasons to prioritize adaptation support for least-developed countries, 
which tend to be highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In fact, without effective 
adaptation the development achievements of past decades will be at risk (e.g. World Bank 2010).  
 
Our findings also relate to the widely held view, expressed most prominently by Schelling (1992, 
1997) that economic development is an effective way to reduce vulnerability to climate change, 
although our argumentation is slightly different. Unlike Schelling, we acknowledge the power of 
dedicated adaptation spending in reducing vulnerability. Our point is that, whatever the nature of 
the transfers, developing countries will find their own balance between adaptation and 
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development. See also Bowen et al. (2012) for a more nuanced discussion of the links between 
climate vulnerability, adaptation and development. 
 
The results depend on an international agreement that constrains all global emissions. This may 
at first glance appear unrealistic. However, a comprehensive agreement on emissions is the 
explicit aim of the international climate negotiations and the cap on emissions does not need to 
be strict or environmentally optimal for the model to work. The assumption does not necessarily 
constrain emissions in the South as their emissions limit may be set close to their business-as-
usual level.  
 
The model could be extended in several directions. Output could be modeled as a function of the 
stock of productive capital, which would hence introduce an endogenous capital investment 
process as in Bretschger and Suphaphiphat (2014). However, this would complicate the analyses 
considerably without fundamentally affecting the basic results derived in the simpler 
formulation.  
 
A more interesting extension would be the introduction of further market imperfections. The 
barriers to adaptation we have introduced is a potential capital constraint in low income countries 
where adaptation competes with subsistence consumption, as well as institutional barriers due to, 
e.g., corruption. Yet, there are many other constraints that could restrain the adaptation potential 
in the South, related to a lack of adaptive capacity. It would be interesting to investigate how this 
might affect the results and maybe open up the possibility for other types of assistance (like 
subsidized loans and technical assistance).  
 
A third set of extensions could involve alternative ways of modeling the equity preferences of 
the North. One interesting option would be to study the historical responsibility case, where 
climate damages rather than the consumption level in the South enters North’s utility function, or 
alternatively that the North is only concerned about the size of the transfers and not on the effect.  
Clearly, many different ethical tenets and formulations are conceivable but are beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
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Annex 1: The optimization problems 
Financial transfers and mitigation in the South 
The optimization problem of the South with respect to mitigation is given by maximizing the 
following Lagrangian, 
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where 
S  is the shadow price on carbon. Assuming the emissions constraint is binding, the 
necessary first-order condition (FOC) for an interior solution is 
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Financial transfers and adaptation in the South 
The maximization problem of the South with respect to adaptation is given by:  
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The necessary first-order condition for a maximum (interior solution
24
) with respect to adaptation 
effort, Sa , is given by: 
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24
 Sufficient conditions for an interior solution are that the first unit of investment in adaptation has a very large 
effect on the residual damages (  0lim ja j ja    ) and that this effect vanishes for very large investments  
(  lim 0
ia i i
a   ). 
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The financial transfer decisions of the North  
The optimization problem for the North can then be written as 
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where N  is the shadow price of carbon in the North. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions, where the 
choices of the South are taken as given, are 
 
(27)      1 ˆ1 1 0iN SS S S Sa a
a
y T D e
T T
  
  
       
  
L
 
(28)  1 0N Sm m
m
T T
 
  
     
  
L
 
(29)        1ˆ ˆ1 1 1 0,a iN S S SS S s S S S Si i i i
m a a
a T D e y T D e
T T T T
    
                                 
L  
 
where equality holds for interior solutions of the respective endogenous variables. 
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Annex 2: Mitigation and adaptation in an income-constrained South  
Consider the case where the South is constrained in the sense that a minimal consumption level 
c  is required in every period, see the optimization problem in equation (16) and the first order 
conditions (FOCs) in equations (17) and (18). 
 
Combining the two FOCs above and totally differentiating yields: 
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Combining this with the differentiated minimal consumption constraint and emission constraint, 
we can write the following system of three equations in three endogenous variables:  
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Reorganizing and defining 
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Rewriting in matrix notation: 
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It can easily be checked that the determinant of the coefficient matrix is positive and equal to 
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The full comparative statics for mitigation are shown below. 
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The full comparative statics for adaptation are shown below. 
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